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(pp. 76-79) provides a list of data concerning the rulers, together with Scripture 
references and dates; and Appendix C (pp. 80 - 85) furnishes coordinations between 
ancient astronomically established years and the dates of the Hebrew kings. 
There is a short glossary of terms (pp. 87-89), which is obviously a useful inclusion 
in a book of this sort. A general index is lacking, but the Scripture index (pp. 91-93) 
will in any event probably prove more helpful for locating the type of information 
desired from this kind of publication. 
Although this particular volume is much shorter than Thiele's Mysterious Numbers, 
it covers the essentials of the subject very well. In fact, it is truly amazing that so 
complex and extensive a subject could be treated in such a clear and effective manner 
in a book of fewer than 100 pages! 
Andrews University KENNETH A. STRAND 
Wogaman, J. Philip. A Christian Method of Moral Judgment. Philadelphia: West- 
minster, 1976. xi + 270 pp. $12.50/$6.95. 
According to  J. Philip Wogaman, we have entered an age of moral uncertainty. In 
this book, the Dean of Wesley Theological Seminary claims that the modem loss of 
confidence is world-wide, affecting both Christians and non-Christians. In the past, 
Christians may have relied uncritically on the Bible, the Church, natural law, or 
simply on custom. But such absolute trust no longer seems tenable. The net effect 
has been to  increase uncertainty at a time when moral dilemmas have increased in 
complexity. But in spite of the uncertainties, Wogaman argues that Christian faith 
must be capable of guiding our moral decisions, or else such faith is surely nonsense. 
The question is: What method of moral judgment can be consistent with a whole- 
hearted commitment to  the values of the Christian faith while realistically taking 
into account the inevitable uncertainties of all human decision-making? 
Wogaman believes that the method he offers has such a capacity. Moreover, he 
believes that his approach avoids the deficiencies of situation ethics on the one hand 
and of a more rule-oriented ethic on the other. Situation ethics, because it is basically 
intuitive, is inadequate and can bring but little precision to our moral decision-making. 
The anti-situationalists, on the other hand, have failed to  provide a convincing 
method of judgment which properly takes into account the "margin of uncertainty" 
which must be considered in the application of any moral decision. 
Wogaman calls his own approach one of "methodological presumption." A moral 
presumption is a considered prejudgment. It is a strong bias in favor of a moral value 
or course of moral action. Wogaman's analogy is the Anglo-American legal system's 
presumption of innocence for the accused. Such presumptions are not exceptionless, 
but any exception must meet stiff criteria. As Wogaman puts it, the exception must 
"bear the burden of proof." E.g., one exception-making criterion is that an action 
contrary to  a moral presumption will likely produce more good in the long run. But 
if after consideration of the exception doubt still remains, then the moral presumption 
stands. 
Can such moral presumptions be derived from the Christian faith? Wogaman thinks 
so. He offers as examples four positive and two negative moral presumptions. On the 
positive side, he claims that Christian faith presumes (1) the goodness of created 
existence, (2) the value of individual life, (3) the unity of all humanity, and (4) the 
equality of each person. And on the negative side, Christianity teaches that humans 
are (1) finite and (2) sinful. Wogaman also discusses several other kinds of presump- 
tions supposedly derived from the Christian faith, including presumptions of human 
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authority (e.g., the church has presumptive moral authority) and presumptions of 
ideology (e.g., fascism and anarchism are presumed to  be wrong). 
No reader is likely to  agree with all of Wogaman's conclusions. But his crisp and 
highly readable style, his frequent use of apt illustrations, and his willingness to  
tackle difficult methodological issues without heavy reliance on technical language 
have combined to  produce a work which should be interesting to  professionals in 
the field and yet understandable for college undergraduates. In terms of its range of 
topics and general purpose, Wogaman's work might be compared to  Edward LeRoy 
Long's A Survey o f  Christian Ethics (New York, 1967). But Long's book is unques- 
tionably more technical and detailed in its presentation, a fact which may lead t o  the 
fairly safe conclusion that Wogaman's publication will gain a far wider usage. 
The book is not dazzling in its originality. Nor is it likely to generate as much 
commotion as J. F. Fletcher's Situation Ethics: The New Morality (Philadelphia, 
1966). But to  this reviewer the method of stating and defending general principles 
and setting forth exception-making criteria is far more plausible than Fletcher's 
approach. Wogaman criticizes anti-situationalists like Paul Ramsey and John C. 
Bennett early in the book. But on balance, Wogaman's method seems far closer to  
these two thinkers than to either the situationalists or t o  those Wogaman dubs 
"evangelical perfectionists," such as John Howard Yoder and Jacques Ellul. 
The similarities are especially conspicuous when Wogaman is compared with 
Bennett. Indeed, though differing in scope, the one recent book in Christian ethics 
which seems closest to  Wogaman's in methodology and general spirit is Bennett's 
The Radical Imperative (Philadelphia, 197 5 ) .  Both Bennett and Wogaman concern 
themselves primarily with the application of Christian faith to the problems of 
contemporary social ethics. Both find the approach of situation ethics less than 
adequate. Both tend to  state general principles such as human unity and human 
equality. And both emphasize that exceptions to  generally valid moral principles 
must bear a heavy burden of proof. (In fact, even the phraseology is sometimes similar, 
with Bennett also using the expression "burden of proof.") Although they both wish 
to  maintain the importance of Christian faith for the construction of an ethical 
system, neither Wogaman nor Bennett believes that Christians have a monopoly on 
morality or that non-Christians do not share many of the same moral insights. Both 
take sin seriously and recognize the ambiguities of many moral decisions. Considering 
these and other areas of agreement, it is probably not surprising that their conclusions 
on a variety of social ethical questions are remarkably similar. 
There are, of course, notable differences. And one of those differences reveals a 
fairly obvious weakness of Wogaman's book. Bennett devotes an entire chapter to  
the way in which ethical guidance is derived from biblical sources. But Wogaman 
leaves the reader with little explicit information about how he uses the Bible to  aid 
in the establishment of Christian moral presumptions. Early in the book he tells his 
readers that the moral authority of the Bible has been weakened by the realization 
that the biblical writers were "flesh -and -blood human beings writing in quite human 
circumstances" (p. 6). Later he says that the Bible contains a variety of materials 
with different levels of meaning. But even though he spends one whole chapter on 
the moral presumptions of human authority, nowhere does he establish in what sense 
the Bible may retain moral authority. 
Nevertheless, Wogaman clearly believes that his moral presumptions have biblical 
bases. And from observing the way he uses the biblical material, perhaps one may 
draw some conclusions about the methodology he considers appropriate. But occa- 
sionally he argues that some biblical teachings counter the moral presumptions of the 
Christian faith. E.g., he considers that the apostle Paul may unfortunately have 
conveyed a negative view of sex. But the moral presumption of the goodness of 
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created existence implies that sexual life is good. Thus, the moral presumption 
apparently may be used to evaluate the Pauline message. The trouble is that Wogaman 
does not develop a methodology which would allow some biblical passages to be used 
to support moral presumptions, which presumptions may in turn be used to  evaluate 
the moral worth of other biblical passages. Yet, in spite of this lack of methodological 
clarity, Wogaman does not hesitate to reassure the reader that a particular moral 
presumption is "solidly biblical." 
On this point, Wogaman's work would surely have been strengthened by some 
timely advice from two of his colleagues at Wesley Theological Seminary, Bruce Birch 
and Larry Rasmussen. In their provocative book, Bible and Ethics in the Christian 
Life (Minneapolis, 1976), they discuss the problem of relating the field of biblical 
scholarship to  contemporary Christian ethics. "It is time," they say, "to make the 
connections between these fields and to assist in the functional relating of Bible 
and ethics in the Christian life" (p. 12). For all of its admirable clarity and thorough- 
ness, Wogaman's book needs strengthening in this area. No method of moral judg- 
ment called Christian is likely to be deemed plausible so long as the role of the Bible 
is not clarified. 
Walla Walla College 
College Place, Washington 
Wolff, Hans Walter. Joel and Amos. Hermeneia-A Critical and Historical Commentary 
on the Bible. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977. xxiv + 392 pp. $22.95. 
This is the second OT volume to  appear in the new Hermeneia commentary series, 
the preceding volume, Hosea, also being written by Wolff. This new volume was 
originally published in German as vol. 1412 of the Biblischer Kommentar Altes 
Testament (of which Wolff is the editor), and three North American scholars co- 
operated in its translation. Wolff has also published another study on Amos, Amos 
the Prophet (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1973 [originally Amos'geistige Heimat, 1964]), 
which deals largely with matters of introduction and form criticism. 
The present volume begins with eighty pages on Joel and concludes with 270 
pages on Amos. It includes an updated bibliography and indexes of biblical citations, 
ancient sources, moderp authors, Hebrew words, and topics treated. Each passage of 
text proceeds through a fourfold treatment: translation with notes, form-critical 
observations, interpretation or exegesis, and aim or theology. This format was also 
followed in Wolff's work on Hosea, and it seems to provide a useful layout of informa- 
tion with which to study these prophets. 
As far as, content is concerned, most of my remarks will deal with Amos, but 
brief mention should be made of Joel. Wolff has argued forcefully for the unity of 
Joel, and he has summarized succinctly the important theme of the Day of Yahweh. 
The date of Joel is a controversial point in OT circles, and one can find almost any 
date imaginable suggested for it. Even for so controversial a subject, however, Wolff's 
date in the first half of the fourth century seems too late to  me. 
Wolff holds that Amos' career was relatively short but not ultrashort, a conclusion 
with which I concur. He also holds that Amos may have prophesied in several centers 
of the northern kingdom, but I would prefer to  see this prophet's ministry restricted 
to Bethel. The richness of Amos' language and poetic style have been explored well 
by Wolff in his introduction. Chiasm could be added t o  the catalogue of poetic 
techniques of which Amos was fond, for I count more than thirty chiastic bicola in 
his work. As far as the final form of the book is concerned, Wolff sees this as the end 
product of a long history of literary growth, a natural deduction from Wolff's form 
